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Abstract
The article shows that in a ﬁnite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig
model (1983), the ex ante efficient allocation can be implemented as a unique
equilibrium. This is so even in the presence of the sequential service constraint,
as emphasized by Wallace (1988), whereby the bank must solve a sequence of
maximization problems as depositors contact it at different times. A three-trader
example with constant relative risk-aversion utility is used in order to illustrate
clearly the requirements that the sequential service constraint imposes on
implementation.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.History is replete with instances in which a seemingly
healthy economy has plunged into difficulty, investors
have become suddenly insistent on exercising contrac-
tual options to mitigate their individual risks, and ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries have consequently become unable to
honor all their commitments. To design good policy to
prevent or mitigate such crises, economic policymakers
need to make a judgment about causality. Is ﬁnancial in-
termediation’s structure unstable and thus causing the
broader economic difficulty? Or is the observed instabil-
ity among ﬁnancial intermediaries merely reﬂecting that
broader economic difficulty? Douglas Diamond and
Philip Dybvig (1983; reprinted in this issue of the Quar-
terly Review) have provided a classic theory to formalize
the ﬁrst possibility, the idea that ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion’s structure causes economic crises.
1 We demonstrate
here that Diamond and Dybvig’s theory is incomplete,
so that the second possibility remains a live one. Further
work is needed to determine what’s missing in Diamond
and Dybvig’s theory and ultimately to provide policy-
makers with a better understanding of ﬁnancial interme-
diation.
As Neil Wallace (1988, pp. 4, 8–9) points out, the
environment Diamond and Dybvig consider has four
key ingredients of an actual banking system: uncertain-
ty about people’s preferences for expenditure streams,
which produces demand for liquid assets; privacy of in-
formation about these preferences after they have been
realized (information about people’s types, whether they
are patient or impatient to consume); a sequential service
constraint, or a rule that spending by different people
must occur successively; and real investment projects
that are costly to restart if they are interrupted. Diamond
and Dybvig argue that welfare-maximizing agents in
such an environment will select a banking arrangement
that resembles a demand deposit contract which can im-
plement the efficient allocation in an equilibrium. More-
over, unless the economy also has either deposit insur-
ance or a suspension of payments contingency such as
existed until the 1930s in the United States, ﬁnancial in-
termediation via demand deposit contracts will have a
bank run equilibrium. That is the sense in which Dia-
mond and Dybvig think that ﬁnancial intermediation’s
instability can be a cause, rather than merely a side ef-
fect, of broad economic crises.
Diamond and Dybvig make their fundamental point in
a benchmark model which has no aggregate uncertainty
about the number of agents who are impatient to con-
sume (and thus want to withdraw their deposits early).
Diamond and Dybvig then show that a suspension of
payments scheme can eliminate the bank run equilibrium
in the benchmark model and that, with aggregate uncer-
tainty, when the suspension of payments scheme does not
work, a deposit insurance arrangement can do the trick.
The contractual arrangements considered by Diamond
and Dybvig are limited to a space of feasible arrange-
ments that, as they point out, is too narrow to implement
an efficient allocation in the environment with aggregate
uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, Diamond and Dybvig assume
that the banking arrangement must give all depositors
who demand early withdrawals the same amount of con-
sumption, namely, the socially efficient amount calculat-
ed based on the true parameter (the fraction of impatient
depositors), no matter how many depositors actually
claim to be impatient. In the Diamond and Dybvig mod-
el, although the consumption given to individual deposi-
tors varies with their own claimed types, the amount for
each type does not depend on the full information com-
municated to the bank by all depositors collectively. Let
us call this approach simple contracting.
We suggest that Diamond and Dybvig’s theory is in-
complete in an important respect. In particular, we argue
that the demand deposit contract considered by Diamond
and Dybvig is only one of the feasible arrangements in
the environment of their model. We show that a contrac-
tual arrangement exists that implements an efficient allo-
cation in their environment with aggregate uncertainty,
but without a bank run equilibrium.
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Instead of restricting attention to only simple contract-
ing, we allow the bank to use more fully the information
reported by all depositors regarding their preferences.
The banking arrangement in our model speciﬁes con-
sumptions for each depositor, or trader, of each type un-
der all possible conﬁgurations of types reported to the
bank. In fact, for each vector of messages that the traders
send to the bank, reporting their types, our arrangement
assigns traders the efficient allocation computed for the
entire reported economy. Moreover, under this arrange-
ment, individual traders always ﬁnd it in their best inter-
est to truthfully report their types. Hence, the efficient al-
location for the model’s true economy prevails in the
unique equilibrium. (Recall that, in Diamond and Dyb-
vig’s environment with aggregate uncertainty, the con-
tractual arrangement that they study has multiple equilib-
ria, and generally, all are inefficient.) Also, in our model,
as in Diamond and Dybvig’s, the banking arrangement
contains elements of a demand deposit contract; traders
have the freedom to choose either to consume early (by
claiming to be impatient) or to wait to consume when
their assets mature (by claiming to be patient). However,
our arrangement will never involve bank runs. These
properties hold even when the bank faces the sequential
service constraint. In light of our ﬁndings, from a mech-
anism design approach, Diamond and Dybvig’s bank run
equilibrium appears to be an artifact of their simple con-
tracting approach rather than a genuine feature of the eco-
nomic environment that they have modeled.
Our analysis does not diminish the fundamental im-
portance of Diamond and Dybvig’s insight regarding ﬁ-
nancial instability, but we think it shows the need to syn-
thesize that insight with further ideas in order to fully
understand ﬁnancial instability. In light of the strikingly
opposite features of our model’s results and the U.S. his-
tory of bank runs, we wonder, what might prevent ra-
tional agents in the Diamond and Dybvig environment
from using efficient arrangements, or mechanisms, such
as the one in our model? What would lead them instead
to adopt the potentially destabilizing demand deposit
contract considered by Diamond and Dybvig? Our pur-
pose here is simply to raise such questions, not to answer
them. Our results imply that environmental features from
which Diamond and Dybvig’s model abstracts are cru-
cial to a full understanding of banking instability. At the
end of the article, we reﬂect on our analysis to identify
some promising candidates for further, complementary
research.The Model
The model we use is a ﬁnite-trader version of the Dia-
mond and Dybvig model with aggregate risk.
Consider a population of I traders, each of whom is
endowed with one unit of a divisible good. The good
can be either consumed at date 0 or transformed into a
consumption good available at date 1. For each unit of
the good used as an input, the transformation technology
produces R > 1 units of consumption good at date 1.
At the beginning of life (date 0), all traders are uncer-
tain about their preferences over consumption streams.
With probability p, a trader becomes patient (type 1) and
values the sum of date 0 and date 1 consumption. With
probability 1 − p, a trader becomes impatient (type 0)
and values date 0 consumption only. Here, as in Dia-
mond and Dybvig’s model, the utility function is v(c0)
for an impatient trader and v(c0+c1) for a patient trader,
where ct denotes consumption at date t.
For simplicity, we assume that the population is limit-
ed to three traders, each having the utility function v(c)=
c
1−γ/(1−γ) with a risk aversion parameter of γ > 1. Re-
sults derived in this simple setup, however, also hold in
more general settings. The economic content of the as-
sumption that γ > 1 is that traders’ relative risk aversion
is greater than 1 everywhere.
All traders learn which type they are (patient or im-
patient) at date 0. Types are private information. In au-
tarky, a patient trader would have higher utility ex post
than an impatient trader because patient traders have an
opportunity to apply the intertemporal transformation
technology to their endowments. Because traders are
risk averse, they would like to enter ex ante into an ar-
rangement to insure themselves (and so, one another)
against preference shock risk.
Thus, to protect themselves against preference shocks,
the traders at the beginning of date 0 (before anyone
learns their types) pool their resources and set up a bank,
which is actually a clublike arrangement among the trad-
ers. The bylaws of the bank specify a rule, according to
which each trader will receive consumption that may de-
pend on the trader’s report, or message, to the bank
about the trader’s privately observed type. A message of
0 sent by a trader means that the trader is impatient,
while a message of 1 means the trader is patient. The
traders are assumed to specify the bylaws to maximize
the ex ante total utility of all traders. The bylaws thus
stipulate a resource distribution rule, which speciﬁes the
amount of consumption that each trader receives at each
date for each possible conﬁguration of reported trader
types. We will show that this rule has an equal treatment
property: In each state of nature, all type 0 traders should
receive identical consumption c0 at date 0, and all type 1
traders should receive identical consumption c1 at date 1.
(The date 0 consumption for type 1 traders should be ze-
ro because R > 1.)
So far, the only signiﬁcant difference between our
setting and Diamond and Dybvig’s is the size of the pop-
ulation. Diamond and Dybvig consider an inﬁnite popu-
lation. In contrast, we have only three traders, and indi-
vidual-level randomness implies that our model always
has aggregate uncertainty.
Another aspect of our model differs from Diamond
and Dybvig’s: the sequential service constraint. Diamond
and Dybvig discuss this constraint informally, but do not
model it explicitly. We do. In our model, during date 0,
traders arrive at the bank in random order. All traders ob-
serve their own arrival times. They also observe whether
they, themselves, are the ﬁrst, the second, or the third to
arrive at the bank.
3 The resource distribution rule (stip-
ulated in the bank bylaws) speciﬁes that the ith trader to
arrive at the bank sends a message mi ∈ {0,1} to the bank
when approaching it, with mi = 0 standing for being im-
patient and mi = 1 for being patient. The bank then dis-
tributes the traders’ pooled resources on the basis of the
messages it has received.
Formally, we model sequential service in the follow-
ing way. Let xi(m) denote the consumption given to the
trader who is the ith to arrive at the bank, where m ≡
(m1,m2,m3).
4 The sequential service constraint requires
that for any m, x1(m)=x1 if m1 = 0 and x2(m)=x2(m1)
if m2 = 0. That is, the consumption given to the ith
trader who reports being impatient must not depend on
information from traders who arrive later, since those
traders have not yet communicated their information to
the bank. Since a patient trader does not consume until
date 1, after all traders have sent their messages to the
bank at date 0, the consumption given to a patient trader
can be determined on the basis of all traders’ messages.
Banking Without
a Sequential Service Constraint
First, we consider the model environment without as-
suming a sequential service constraint. That is, we as-
sume that each trader’s consumption can be made to de-
pend on the reports of all three traders. We characterize
an optimal resource distribution rule, and we show that
this rule induces truth-telling as the unique reporting de-
cision of rational, optimizing traders. If a bank run is in-
terpreted as an inefficient equilibrium in which traders
who are actually patient misrepresent themselves as be-
ing impatient, then no bank run can occur when this op-
timal rule is adopted.
We begin our study by abstracting from the sequen-
tial service constraint because this environment is pre-
cisely the ﬁnite-trader analog of the formal Diamond and
Dybvig model environment. Thus, the result suggests
that Diamond and Dybvig’s ad hoc focus on a particular
class of rules regarding demand deposit contracts, with
or without suspension of payments, is crucial to their
ﬁnding of a dilemma of having to choose between eco-
nomic inefficiency and banking instability (the existence
of a bank run equilibrium).
Another reason for beginning our study without the
sequential service constraint is to exhibit, in as simple a
setting as possible, the logic of our main argument. The
argument has two parts. First, we imagine that traders’
types are public information, and we characterize the op-
timal resource distribution rule that would use this infor-
mation directly. Second, we take into account the fact
that the resources must be distributed on the basis of
traders’ unveriﬁable and unfalsiﬁable reports, rather than
on the basis of the true situation. Thus, the rule that we
have characterized in the hypothetical environment with
public information can only be used in the private-infor-
mation environment if traders can be trusted to tell the
truth voluntarily. That is, the rule is usable only if, what-
ever their types, traders can achieve higher utility bytruth-telling than by lying. We show that an environment
without the sequential service constraint has a very
strong truth-telling incentive: each trader does best by
telling the truth, regardless of whether or not other trad-
ers are truthful. (We will derive a result in the same spir-
it, although slightly weaker, when we take account of the
sequential service constraint.) Clearly, with this unam-
biguous incentive, all traders will tell the truth, so there
can be no bank run equilibrium.
To develop this argument, suppose that traders receive
consumption after they all have reported their types to
the bank. (That is, ignore the sequential service con-
straint.) Also, suppose that the true state of nature, ω,i s
known—or, equivalently, that the proﬁle m of traders’
messages to the bank is identical to ω. We will charac-
terize the rule that maximizes the sum of traders’ ex ante
expected utility levels.
The trick to solving this maximization problem is to
maximize the sum of traders’ ex post utilities in each
state of nature and note that the problems of maximiz-
ing ex ante and ex post utility have the same solution in
this environment. Let θ(ω) denote the number of patient
traders in a given state of nature ω. Ex post efficiency
requires that the endowment good’s marginal utility to
an impatient trader equal that to a patient trader in each
state of nature,
(1) v′(c0(θ(ω))) = Rv′(c1(θ(ω)))
and that the following resource constraint be satisﬁed:
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(2) [I − θ(ω)]c0(θ(ω)) + R
−1θ(ω)c1(θ(ω)) = I.
Equations (1) and (2) determine the functions c0(ω) and
c1(ω) completely.
For the assumed utility function v(c)=c
1−γ/(1−γ), it
is straightforward to solve these two equations:






This completes the ﬁrst stage of our argument.
Now we must undertake the second stage, to show
that traders would always choose to report their types
truthfully if this rule (based on their reports rather than
on their true states) were to determine their consump-
tion. Since R > 1, we have that c1(θ) is greater than
c0(θ) and that both increase with θ. The patient traders
can take advantage of the transformation technology, so
they each receive more consumption than do the impa-
tient traders. Furthermore, in states of nature in which
the number of impatient traders is smaller, more endow-
ment gets to be transferred to date 1 consumption, en-
abling both types of traders to consume more.
At date 0, when traders learn their types, they send
messages reporting their types to the bank. The bank
calculates the value of θ(ω) based on these reports and
then distributes resources according to the consumptions
derived above. Regardless of whether or not the calcu-
lated value of θ is actually the true value, each trader has
the incentive to truthfully report his or her own type,
whatever messages other traders send.
To see this, consider separately each of the two pos-
sible types of traders. If a trader is type 0, then the trader
receives c0(θ) at date 0 if he or she sends a message of 0,
but receives no consumption until date 1 if he or she
sends a message of 1. Since an impatient trader values
date 0 consumption only, this trader strictly prefers to tell
the truth. Now consider a trader of type 1. Regardless of
what messages other traders send, the patient trader re-
ceives c1(θ) if he or she sends a message of 1 and
c0(θ−1) if he or she sends a message of 0. As we have
explained above, c1(θ)>c1(θ−1) > c0(θ−1). Thus, a pa-
tient trader prefers to send a truthful message as well.
Therefore, the banking arrangement here has the proper-
ty that truth-telling is the strictly dominant strategy for
all traders. Roger Myerson (1991) has shown that a pro-
ﬁle of strictly dominant strategies for a mechanism is the
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mechanism.
Therefore, here, no alternative, inefficient bank run equi-
librium can exist.
Banking With a Sequential Service Constraint
The simple model of banking studied above abstracts
from key features of an actual bank: usually, traders do
not all contact the bank at the same time, and the bank
must deal promptly with traders who contact it early. An
actual bank is thus constrained from making its treat-
ment of early traders contingent on information yet to be
provided by later traders, especially if the early traders
want to make withdrawals.
6 Now we modify the model
to make it more realistic in this sense. We require traders
to contact the bank sequentially during date 0, according
to the sequential service constraint formalized above.
The general logic of our argument here is parallel to
that just used. We ﬁrst deﬁne the efficient allocation in
this economy assuming that traders report their true
types to the bank. Then we prove that under the speci-
ﬁed rule of distributing resources, it is in the best inter-
ests of the traders to truthfully report their types to the
bank and that the symmetric efficient allocation can be
implemented as the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the mechanism.
The Bank’s Planning Problem
An allocation in this three-trader economy with sequen-
tial service is a list of consumption bundles xi(m) for all
i and m which the bank (here, the social planner) must
choose. An allocation is feasible if, in each state of na-
ture, the total amount of consumption the patient traders
receive from the bank equals R times the amount of re-
sources available after the bank gives consumption to




for all m. This is the economy’s resource constraint.
The bank must choose an allocation to maximize the
sum of expected utility of all traders. The efficient allo-





subject to the resource constraint (5).
The form of the above optimization problem (an ad-
ditively separable objective function in terms of v(xi) and
the resource constraint in distinct states of nature) im-
plies that the problem can be solved using the usual dy-
namic programming techniques: maximizing total utility
implies optimizing along each path of realizations of
trader types. For instance, at the efficient allocation, x1(0)
must be such that it maximizes the utility of the ﬁrst
trader to arrive at the bank, v(x1(0)), plus the sum of the
expected utilities of the second and third traders condi-
tional on m1 = 0. Therefore, in what follows, we will
solve the bank’s problem using the usual backward in-
duction procedure. Speciﬁcally, we start by deriving the
optimal consumption for the trader who is the last to
arrive at the bank and then move on to optimization
problems for traders who arrived earlier. Each problem
is solved based on the information reported by the trad-
ers as they arrive at the bank. We then show that the
traders have the incentive to truthfully reveal their types
when they make decisions, so privacy of information is
actually not a binding constraint in the bank’s planning
problem.
Consumption for the Last Trader
We start, again, with the last trader to arrive at the bank.
Let y(m1,m2) denote the amount of endowment the
bank has left when the last trader arrives. That is, I − y
has been given out to previously arriving traders, who
have sent messages of m1 and m2. The bank’s decision
problem here is simple. If the last trader is patient (m3 =
1), then that trader at date 1 will receive Ry/θ, the trad-
er’s share of the remaining endowment transformed by
the R technology, where θ≡m1 + m2 + m3. If, instead,
the last trader is impatient, then the bank needs to im-
mediately assign that trader consumption at date 0, de-
noted by x3(m1,m2,0), by balancing the trader’s marginal
utility with that of the patient traders. Thus, x3(m1,m2,0)
satisﬁes the following:
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(7) x3(m1,m2,0) = arg maxx3 v(x3)
+( m1+m2)v(R(y−x3)/(m1+m2)).
The ﬁrst-order condition is thus v′(x3)=Rv′(R(y−x3) ÷
(m1+m2)). Since R >1 ,v′(x3)>v′(R(y−x3)/(m1+m2)).
Under the assumption that the traders’ relative risk aver-
sion is greater than 1, the ﬁrst-order condition also im-
plies that v′(x3)<v′((y−x3)/(m1+m2)).
8 Since v″ <0 ,w e
have the following result:
LEMMA.
The following bounds apply to x3(m1,m2,0):
(8) y/(m1+m2+1) < x3(m1,m2,0) < Ry/(m1+m2+1).
An immediate implication of the lemma is that the
trader who is the last to arrive at the bank never wants to
lie about his or her type. If the trader is impatient, he or
she surely does not want to claim to be patient because
the trader does not value date 1 consumption. If the
trader is patient, then he or she will receive more for tell-
ing the truth, Ry/(m1+m2+1), than for lying, x3(m1,m2,0).
From the utility function v(c)=c
1−γ/(1−γ), it is easily
derived that
(9) x3(m1,m2,0) = y(m1,m2)/[1 + (m1+m2)R
(1/γ)−1].
Consumption for the Second Trader
Now consider the trader who is second to arrive at the
bank.
The amount of endowment the bank has available now
is either I or I − x1(0), depending on whether or not the
ﬁrst trader is patient. If the second trader is patient, then
at date 1 that trader will receive his or her share of R
times the amount of the endowment not distributed to
impatient traders, equally divided among all the patient
traders. Otherwise, the bank must assign the trader date 0
consumption immediately. Below, we derive the optimal
consumption for the second trader when that trader is of
type 0, x2(m1,0).
With a Patient First Trader
Suppose that the ﬁrst-arriving trader claims to be patient
(m1 = 1). In determining the value of x2(1,0), the bank
must take into consideration the possible type of the
third trader, who is yet to arrive, as well as the ﬁrst trad-
er, who has been waiting to consume at date 1. Suppose
that x2(1,0) is given to the second trader. With probabil-
ity p, the third trader is patient; then that trader and the
ﬁrst each get R[I − x2(1,0)]/2 at date 1. With probability
1 − p, the third trader is impatient; then that trader re-
ceives at date 0 the amount x3(1,0,0), as determined op-
timally in equation (7), and the ﬁrst trader receives the
amount of x1(1,0,0) = R[I − x2(1,0) − x3(1,0,0)] at date 1.
Given these probabilities, the bank chooses x2(1,0) to
maximize the total utility of all three traders:
(10) maxx2(1,0) v(x2(1,0)) +2 pv(R[I − x2(1,0)]/2)
+( 1 −p)[v(x3(1,0,0)) + v(x1(1,0,0))].
The ﬁrst-order condition for this maximization prob-
lem, after the envelope theorem is applied, is
(11) v′(x2(1,0)) = Rv′(x1(1,0,0))
− pR(v′(x1(1,0,0))
− v′(R[I − x2(1,0)]/2)).
For v(c)=c
1−γ/(1−γ), the solution of equation (11) can
be found, via (9), to be
(12) x2(1,0) = I/(1+A
1/γ)
where




1−γ.With an Impatient First Trader
Now suppose that the ﬁrst trader to arrive at the bank is
impatient, so that the amount of the endowment avail-
able to the bank when the second trader arrives is I −
x1(0).
In deciding on x2(0,0), the consumption to be given
to the second-arriving trader when that trader is type 0,
the bank maximizes the sum of the expected utility of
the second and third traders:
(14) V00(x1(0)) ≡ maxx2(0,0) v(x2(0,0))
+( 1 −p)v(x3)+pv(Rx3)
where x3 ≡ I − x1(0) − x2(0,0). With x1(0) given to the
ﬁrst trader and x2(0,0) to the second, the consumption
for the third trader is I − x1(0) − x2(0,0) if that trader is
impatient and R[I − x1(0) − x2(0,0)] if the trader is pa-
tient. The ﬁrst-order condition for x2(0,0) is, thus,
(15) v′(x2)=( 1 −p)v′(I − x1(0) − x2)
+ pRv′(R[I − x1(0) − x2])
which, for v(c)=c
1−γ/(1−γ), has the following solution:
(16) x2(0,0) = [I − x1(0)]/(1+B)
where
(17) B ≡ [1 − p + pR
1−γ]
1/γ.
What is the optimal consumption for the second-
arriving trader if that trader is patient? With probability
p, the third trader is patient; then both the second and
third traders receive R[I − x1(0)]/2 at date 1. With prob-
ability 1 − p, the third trader is impatient; then the third
trader’s optimal date 0 consumption is x3(0,1,0) and the
second trader receives R[I − x1(0) − x3(0,1,0)] at date 1.
Thus, the total utility of the second and third traders,
conditional on the second being patient (and the ﬁrst
being impatient), is
(18) V01(x1(0)) ≡ 2pv(R[I − x1(0)]/2)
+( 1 −p){v(x3(0,1,0)) + v(R[I − x1(0)
− x3(0,1,0)])}.
Consumption for the First Trader
Now consider the trader who is the ﬁrst to arrive at the
bank.
If this trader is impatient, then the bank chooses x1(0)
to maximize the sum of all three traders’ expected utili-
ties:
(19) max v(x1(0)) +( 1 −p)V00(x1(0)) + pV01(x1(0)).
Use v(c)=c
1−γ/(1−γ) and (9) to write the ﬁrst-order
condition for this optimization problem as




+( 1 −p)pR(R[I − x1(0)]/(1+B
−1))
−γ






This yields the following solution:
(21) x1(0) = I/ { 1+[ pA +( 1 −p)(1+B)
γ]
1/γ}.
Since both A and B decrease in p, x1(0) is an increas-
ing function of p. The intuition for this is as follows. As
p rises, the traders who arrive after the ﬁrst trader are
more likely to be patient. Since the consumption of
these patient traders can be supported by the R transfor-
mation technology, x1(0) should increase accordingly in
order to balance the marginal utility of the current impa-
tient trader with that of these later arrivals. Similarly,
the optimal consumption for the second trader derived
earlier, x2(1,0), also increases with p. These properties
will be used later, in the proof of Proposition 1.
The Symmetric Efficient Allocation
The optimal consumptions of traders in every state of
nature have been derived. The banking arrangement (the
mechanism) must distribute the resources according to
these derived consumptions and the traders’ reported
types. Now we show that with the speciﬁed mechanism,
traders in this model will truthfully report their types and
that this truthful communication constitutes the unique
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. To
prove this, we use standard backward induction reason-
ing.
First, consider the trader who arrives at the bank last.
According to the lemma, this third trader always prefers
to tell the truth regardless of the messages sent by previ-
ously arriving traders.
Next, consider the trader who arrives at the bank sec-
ond. Since an impatient trader never claims to be patient,
we only need to consider what happens when the second
trader is patient. Before this trader’s arrival, the available
endowment is either I − x1(0) or I, depending on whether
or not the ﬁrst trader is impatient. Suppose the ﬁrst trad-
er is impatient. Can the second trader beneﬁt from lying,
claiming to be impatient too? If the trader tells the truth,
he or she receives x2(0,1,m3) at date 1, the value of
which depends on the reported type of the third trader. If
the second trader chooses to lie, the trader receives
x2(0,0) right away, at the time of arrival. Thus, the trader
will choose to tell the truth if and only if
(22) v(x2(0,0)) ≤ E[v(x2(0,1,m3))]
where
(23) E[v(x2(0,1,m3))] =
(1−p)v(R[I − x1(0) −x3(0,1,0)])
+ pv(R[I − x1(0)]/2).
Similarly, if the ﬁrst trader to arrive is patient, then the
(patient) second trader will tell the truth if and only if(24) v(x2(1,0)) ≤ E[v(x2(1,1,m3))]
where
(25) E[v(x2(1,1,m3))] =
(1−p)v(R[I − x3(1,1,0)]/2) + pv(R).
Note that, since the third trader never lies about his or
her type, we can use the objective probability of becom-
ing a patient trader, p, to evaluate the expected utilities
in (22) and (25).
Now consider the ﬁrst trader to arrive at the bank.
This trader is patient and receives x1(0) for lying and
x1(1,m2,m3) otherwise. Truth-telling thus requires that




2v(R[I − x2(1,0) − x3(1,0,0)])
+ p
2v(R)+( 1 −p)p(v(R[I − x2(1,0)]/2)
+ v(R[I − x3(1,1,0)]/2)).
The following result, proved in the Appendix, shows
that both the second and ﬁrst traders strictly prefer to tell
the truth about their types because they anticipate truth-
ful communication by the third trader. Thus, truthful re-
porting by all traders is the only equilibrium outcome
that results from backward induction. Hence, it is the
unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mech-
anism.
PROPOSITION 1. Assume that v(c)=c
1−γ/(1−γ) for γ >1 .
Then incentive conditions (22), (25), and (26) hold for
all p ∈ [0,1] and for R >1 .
Finally, we present the following result, which corre-
sponds to a partial suspension of payments scheme un-
der the optimal banking arrangement in our model. (See
Wallace 1990.)
PROPOSITION 2. For all p ∈ [0,1], R >1 ,and γ >1 ,
there is x1(0) > x2(0,0) > x3(0,0,0).
Proof. From the expressions of x1(0) and x2(0,0) derived
earlier, we know that
(28) x2(0,0) = [I − x1(0)]/(1+B)
= {[pA +( 1 −p)(1+B)
γ]
1/γ/(1+B)}x1(0).
Thus, x1(0) > x2(0,0) is equivalent to pA +( 1 −p)(1+B)
γ
< (1+B)
γ. The latter inequality always holds; it is
straightforward to show that A < (1+B)
γ for all p. Also,
since B < 1, we know that x2(0,0) > [I − x1(0)]/2. Thus,
x2(0,0) > I − x1(0) − x2(0,0); that is, x2(0,0) > x3(0,0,0).
Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 2, if all traders demand ear-
ly withdrawal in our model, then the traders who arrive
at the bank earlier receive more consumption than those
who arrive later. (This property also holds for other paths
of realizations of types, such as those in which two of
the three traders claim to be impatient.) Note that such a
partial suspension of payments occurs with positive prob-
ability in our model, although a bank run never occurs.
Conclusion
In a ﬁnite-trader version of the model of Diamond and
Dybvig (1983; reprinted in this issue), we have shown
that the ex ante efficient allocation can be implemented
as a unique equilibrium. In the mechanism we have con-
sidered, truth-telling is the strictly dominant strategy for
all traders in the environment with as well as without
sequential service. All traders prefer truth-telling even
when there is a sequential service constraint because they
expect (correctly) that those who arrive at the bank later
will tell the truth. Therefore, in our model, unlike in Dia-
mond and Dybvig’s, there is no bank run equilibrium.
(These results also hold in more general settings with I
traders and general utility functions, as we have shown in
Green and Lin 1999.)
Diamond and Dybvig interpret their model as an ex-
planation of the numerous observed bank runs in U.S.
history. We are not claiming, of course, that bank runs
do not actually occur. Rather, we are simply trying to
show that within the basic framework of Diamond and
Dybvig—even with the sequential service constraint—
an arrangement exists that implements the efficient al-
location without leading to bank runs. In the model, ra-
tional agents have no reason to bypass this optimal
arrangement and instead choose another that might pro-
duce bank runs in equilibrium. Therefore, we think that
something essential has been neglected in the basic Dia-
mond and Dybvig environment in order to have a theo-
ry that matches U.S. history.
Our model does not capture all of the key features of
an actual banking system either. One obviously missing
feature is the banking system’s ongoing nature. If the
population of an economy has an overlapping-genera-
tions structure, then no trader is the last to arrive at the
bank, so our backward induction argument may not
work. The same problem arises if the size of the popu-
lation is not observable to individual traders, so that no
one is certain whether he or she is the last one in line.
When these features are present, the validity of our no
bank run result needs to be reconsidered. Finally, also
absent in our model are the incentive problems among
bank officials to manage resources in a way that maxi-
mizes the utility of their depositors. Such incentive prob-
lems can result from incomplete information.
9 The bank-
ing contract in our model abstracts from these incentive
problems, which might be a reason such a contract is not
commonly observed. All of these missing features are
worth investigating as we try to improve our understand-
ing of banking instability.
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views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Feder-
al Reserve Banks of Minneapolis or Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.
1Diamond and Dybvig’s work is one of the pivotal contributions to a large lit-
erature on banking contracts and bank runs. Other such contributions include the
work of John Bryant (1980), Charles Jacklin (1987), and Neil Wallace (1988).
2Our mechanism design approach in general involves supposing that the formal
model of the economic environment succeeds in capturing the signiﬁcant relevant
constraints on how contractual arrangements can be structured in the actual econo-
my and then solving the optimization problem of designing an efficient arrangement
subject to those constraints.
3There are 6 (3!) possible orders of arrival of the three traders, and we assume
that each occurs with probability 1/6. This formulation of sequential service is relat-
ed to the night camping story told by Wallace (1988). However, in Wallace’s for-
malization of sequential service, neither a trader’s time of arrival nor a trader’s placein line is in the trader’s own information set. Under Wallace’s assumption, the back-
ward induction reasoning we use later may not necessarily work. In Green and Lin
1999, we relax the assumption that traders know their places in the order of arrival.
However, we still assume richer information about arrival time than Wallace does.
4In principle, xi(m) should specify quantities to be consumed at both dates 0
and 1. For simplicity, we will suppose that a trader who sends a message of 0 (who
reports being impatient) will be permitted to consume only at date 0 and that a trad-
er who sends a message of 1 (who reports being patient) will be permitted to con-
sume only at date 1. The following discussion should make it clear that the optimal
resource distribution rule must have this feature, even if it were not imposed by as-
sumption. We explicitly derive such a result in Green and Lin 1999.
5These conditions also imply ex ante efficiency. See Green and Lin 1999.
6This feature plays a key role in Diamond and Dybvig’s intuitive discussion of
their model, and it is formalized by Wallace (1988), who derives further consequen-
ces from it.
7If all traders claim to be impatient (m1 + m2 + m3 = 0), then the third trader
just consumes the endowment available, so x3(0,0,0) = I − y(0,0).
8To see this, let Φ(R) ≡ Rv′(Rc). Then Φ′ = Rcv″(Rc)+v′(Rc), which is nega-
tive, since cv″(c)/v′(c) ≤ −1 for all c. Thus, Φ(R)<Φ(1); that is, Rv′(Rc)<v′(c) for
all c and for R >1 .
9These problems have been used by Douglas Diamond (1984) and Stephen Wil-
liamson (1987) to argue for the efficiency of standard debt contracts. A synthesis of
their models with Diamond and Dybvig’s might produce a bank run equilibrium un-
der an efficient contract.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Here we prove the preceding text’s Proposition 1, that both
the ﬁrst and second traders to arrive at the bank prefer to tell
the truth about their types because they expect the third trader
to do so.
PROPOSITION 1. Assume that v(c)=c
1−γ/(1−γ) for γ >1 .Then
incentive conditions (22), (25), and (26) hold for all p ∈ [0,1]
and for R >1 .
Proof. Note that for v(c)=c
1−γ/(1−γ), v′(c)=Ψ(v(c)) for all
c, where Ψ(x) = [(1−γ)x]
γ/(γ−1) for Ψ′ < 0 and Ψ″ >0 .
We ﬁrst prove that (22) holds. By (16), I − x1(0) − x2(0,0)
= R[I − x1(0)]/(1+B
−1)<R[I − x1(0)]/2 because B < 1. Yet the
ﬁrst-order condition for x3(0,1,0) implies that x3(0,1,0) = [I −
x1(0)]/(1+R
(1/γ)−1). Thus,
(A1) R[I − x1(0) − x3(0,1,0)] = R[I − x1(0)]/(R
1−(1/γ)+1)
>[ I − x1(0)]/2
>[ I − x1(0)]/(1+B
−1).
From these and the ﬁrst-order condition for x2(0,0), equation
(15), we get that
(A2) v′(x2(0,0)) >( 1 −p)v′(I − x1(0) − x2(0,0))
+ pv′(R[I − x1(0) − x2(0,0)]).
Using v″ < 0 and the above derivations, we have that
(A3) v′(x2(0,0)) >( 1 −p)v′(R[I − x1(0) − x3(0,1,0)])
+ pv′(R[I − x1(0)]/2).
Rewriting the above inequality in terms of function Ψ yields
that
(A4) Ψ(v(x2(0,0)))
>( 1 −p)Ψ(v(R[I − x1(0) − x3(0,1,0)]))
+ pΨ(v(R[I − x1(0)]/2)).
Since Ψ is convex, we have that
(A5) Ψ(v(x2(0,0)))
> Ψ((1−p)v(R[I − x1(0) − x3(0,1,0)])
+ pv(R[I − x1(0)]/2))
which, along with Ψ′ < 0, implies that
(A6) v(x2(0,0)) <( 1 −p)v(R[I − x1(0) − x3(0,1,0)])
+ pv(R[I − x1(0)]/2).
This proves that (22) holds.
By (12), we have that x2(1,0) = I/(2 + R
(1/γ)−1)>I/3 at p =
0. Since x2(1,0) increases with p, we have that R[I − x2(1,0)]/2
< RI/3 = R for all p. Also note that R
(1/γ)−1 <1<R
1−(1/γ). Thus,
x2(1,0) > I/(2 + R
1−(1/γ)) for all p > 0. However, from the ex-
pressions for x3(1,0,0) and x3(1,1,0), we have that
(A7) I − x2(1,0) − x3(1,0,0)
= R
(1/γ)−1[I − x2(1,0)]/(1 + R
(1/γ)−1)
and
(A8) R[I − x3(1,1,0)]/2 = R
(1/γ)−1I/ ( 1+2 R
(1/γ)−1).
Since x2(1,0) > I/(2 + R
1−(1/γ)), we know that
(A9) I − x2(1,0) − x3(1,0,0) < I/(2 + R
1−(1/γ))
= R[I − x3(1,1,0)]/2.
Using the ﬁrst-order condition for x2(1,0), we ﬁnd that
(A10) v′(x2(1,0)) >( 1 −p)v′(R[I − x2(1,0) − x3(1,0,0)])
+ pv′(R[I − x2(1,0)]/2).
The above derivations, along with v″ < 0, imply that
(A11) v′(x2(1,0)) >( 1 −p)v′(R[I − x3(1,1,0)]/2) + pv′(R).
Hence,
(A12) Ψ(v(x2(1,0)))
>( 1 −p)Ψ(v(R[I − x3(1,1,0)]/2)) + pΨ(v(R))
> Ψ((1−p)v(R[I − x3(1,1,0)]/2) + pv(R)).
Since Ψ′ <0 ,
(A13) (1−p)v(R[I − x3(1,1,0)]/2) + pv(R)>v(x2(1,0)).
Therefore, (25) holds.
The incentive compatibility condition (26) for the ﬁrst trad-
er to arrive at the bank can be similarly proved to hold by
using the convexity of Ψ. The proof is lengthy and thus omit-
ted here. Q.E.D.
References
Bryant, John. 1980. A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance. Journal
of Banking and Finance 4 (December): 335–44.
Diamond, Douglas W. 1984. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Re-
view of Economic Studies 51 (July): 383–414.
Diamond, Douglas W., and Dybvig, Philip H. 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance,
and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91 (June): 401–19. Reprinted in
this issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review.Green, Edward J., and Lin, Ping. 1999. Implementing efficient allocations in a mod-
el of ﬁnancial intermediation. Working Paper 92. Centre for Public Policy
Studies, Lingnan University, Hong Kong.
Jacklin, Charles J. 1987. Demand deposits, trading restrictions, and risk sharing. In
Contractual arrangements for intertemporal trade, ed. Edward C. Prescott
and Neil Wallace, pp. 26–47. Minnesota Studies in Macroeconomics, Vol. 1.
Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
Myerson, Roger B. 1991. Game theory: Analysis of conﬂict. Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press.
Wallace, Neil. 1988. Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: The
Diamond-Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously. Federal Re-
serve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 12 (Fall): 3–16.
___________. 1990. A banking model in which partial suspension is best. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 14 (Fall): 11–23.
Williamson, Stephen D. 1987. Costly monitoring, loan contracts, and equilibrium
credit rationing. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (February): 135–45.